Showing posts with label American Hegemony. Show all posts
Showing posts with label American Hegemony. Show all posts

Monday, September 5, 2022

China's Economy Won’t Overtake the U.S., Some Now Predict

I've long been bearish on the China challenge. China has grown, dramatically, and the hype has grown right up along with it. All we can do is "prepare for the worst but hope for the best."

At WSJ, "Slowing growth has dampened expectations that the Chinese economy will be the world’s largest by the end of the decade":

HONG KONG—The sharp slowdown in China’s growth in the past year is prompting many experts to reconsider when China will surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy—or even if it ever will.

Until recently, many economists assumed China’s gross domestic product measured in U.S. dollars would surpass that of the U.S. by the end of the decade, capping what many consider to be the most extraordinary economic ascent ever.

But the outlook for China’s economy has darkened this year, as Beijing-led policies—including its zero tolerance for Covid-19 and efforts to rein in real-estate speculation—have sapped growth. As economists pare back their forecasts for 2022, they have become more worried about China’s longer term prospects, with unfavorable demographics and high debt levels potentially weighing on any rebound.

In one of the most recent revisions, the Centre for Economics and Business Research, a U.K. think tank, thinks China will overtake the U.S. as the world’s biggest economy two years later than it previously expected when it last made a forecast in 2020. It now thinks it will happen in 2030.

The Japan Center for Economic Research in Tokyo has said it thinks the passing of the baton won’t happen until 2033, four years later than its previous forecast.

Other economists question whether China will ever claim the top spot.

Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers said China’s aging population and Beijing’s increasing tendency to intervene in corporate affairs, along with other challenges, have led him to substantially lower his expectations for Chinese growth.

He sees parallels between forecasts of China’s rise and earlier prognostications that Japan or Russia would overtake the U.S.—predictions that look ridiculous today, he said.

“I think there is a real possibility that something similar would happen with respect to China,” said Mr. Summers, now a Harvard University professor.

Researchers debate how meaningful GDP rankings are, and question whether much will change if China does overtake the U.S. The depth and openness of the U.S. economy mean the U.S. will still have outsize influence. The dollar is expected to remain the world’s reserve currency for years to come.

Size alone doesn’t reflect the quality of growth, said Leland Miller, chief executive officer of China Beige Book, a research firm. Living standards in the U.S., measured by per capita gross domestic product, are five times greater than in China, and the gap is unlikely to close soon.

Still, a change in the ranking would be a propaganda win for Beijing as it seeks to show the world—and its own population—that China’s state-led model is superior to Western liberal democracy, and that the U.S. is declining both politically and economically. Over time, it could lead to more-substantive changes as more countries reorient their economies to serve Chinese markets.

“If China slows down substantially in its growth, it impacts China’s capacity to project power,” said Mr. Summers.

How the two countries stack up economically matters to Chinese leaders: After the U.S. economy grew faster than China’s during the last quarter of 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping told officials to ensure the country’s growth outpaces the U.S.’s this year, the Journal previously reported.

Economic fortunes can reverse quickly. In 2020, when China bounced back faster than the U.S. did from initial Covid-19 outbreaks, it looked like China’s economy might surpass the U.S. sooner than expected.

Some economists appear less perturbed by near-term threats to China’s growth. Justin Yifu Lin, a former chief economist at the World Bank who has long been bullish on China’s potential, argues its larger population means the country’s economy will wind up twice as big as the U.S.’s eventually. At a forum in Beijing in May, he predicted that process would continue despite the country’s latest slowdown.

Nevertheless, economic problems keep piling up in China, in part because of policy choices Beijing has made to contain Covid-19 and rein in debt.

The country’s real-estate slowdown is showing no signs of letting up. An index tracking consumer confidence plunged to its lowest level in decades in spring this year. Urban youth unemployment is at a record high.

The Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank, noted in a March report that it expects Chinese growth to average only about 2% to 3% a year between 2021 and 2050, compared with some researchers’ expectations that China could maintain 4% to 5% growth until midcentury. The institute cited unfavorable demographics, diminishing returns from infrastructure investments and other challenges.

With growth of 2% to 3% a year, China could still become the world’s largest economy, the institute noted.

“But it would never establish a meaningful lead over the United States and would remain far less prosperous and productive per person than America, even by mid-century,” it wrote. Its growth also wouldn’t be enough to give it any significant competitive advantage.

In a response to questions, the Lowy Institute said China’s further economic slowdown since the report came out has “at minimum pushed back the likely moment when China might overtake the U.S., and made it more likely that China might in fact never be able to do so.”

With China’s urban youth unemployment at a high, a job fair was held in Beijing last month.

Measured by purchasing power, which takes into account differing costs of goods and services across countries, China already overtook the U.S.’s economy in 2016, according to World Bank figures. Measured in U.S. dollar terms, however, China’s GDP was 77% of the size of the U.S’s. in 2021, up from 13% in 2001, data from the World Bank shows.

Capital Economics researchers wrote in a report early last year that their most likely scenario envisions China’s economy expanding to about 87% of the size of the U.S.’s in 2030, before dropping back to 81% in 2050. It blamed China’s shrinking working population and weak productivity growth, among other factors.

“A lot of people for a long time have overestimated the competence of China’s leadership and have been shocked by the missteps with Covid and the property sector,” wrote Mark Williams, the firm’s chief Asia economist, in an email in which he reaffirmed his firm’s forecast. “The weakness these crises have revealed have been present and growing for a long time.”

Some researchers say China’s ability to overtake the U.S. will depend on whether it pursues more economic policy changes...

 

Sunday, October 10, 2021

China’s Xi Emphasizes ‘Peaceful Reunification’ With Taiwan, Days After Record Show of Force

Well, just in case, we have Marines deployed to Taipei, in case something comes up.

At WSJ, "Taiwanese people would not bow to Chinese pressure, President Tsai Ing-wen said in a speech Sunday":

Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan days after China’s People’s Liberation Army sent a record 56 bombers and other aircraft on sorties near the self-ruled island in a single day.

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen answered in a speech the following day, saying Taiwanese people would not bow to Chinese pressure. “The historical task of the complete reunification of the motherland must be fulfilled, and can definitely be fulfilled,” Mr. Xi said in Beijing on Saturday, adding that achieving that goal by peaceful means is in the interests of people in Taiwan.

Mr. Xi’s remarks were part of a speech that marked the 110th anniversary of the revolution that overturned Qing imperial rule in China. In the decades that followed, the Communists and Nationalists jostled for control of China, which later led to a split between China and Taiwan amid a civil war. Nationalist forces withdrew to the island, and communist leader Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949.

The Communist Party considers Taiwan part of China, despite never having ruled the island, and has vowed to take control of it, by force if necessary.

Mr. Xi has long spoken of realizing what Beijing has called a peaceful reunification with Taiwan, but his remarks came as concerns within the U.S. mounted over China’s yearslong military buildup and recent threatening moves against the island.

The PLA has flown 150 sorties near Taiwan so far this month, a blitz that has sparked expressions of concern from the U.S., U.K. and Germany.

On Thursday, The Wall Street Journal reported that a small number of American troops have been secretly training local military forces on the island.

Taiwan’s independence is the biggest obstacle to Beijing’s goal of unification and poses a “serious hidden danger to national rejuvenation,” Mr. Xi said. “Those who forget their ancestors, betray the motherland or split the country have always been doomed. They will definitely be spurned by the people and judged by history,” he added...

 

Tuesday, December 4, 2018

Simpler Times

I found another "American Power" guy on Twitter, lol.


Thursday, January 18, 2018

Gallup: Approval of U.S. Leadership Drops to New Low in Global Survey

Who cares?

There's a reason "America First" resonates with the lunch bucket set. Who cares what the rest of the world thinks? Sheesh.

At Politico, "Poll: Under Trump, global approval of U.S. leadership hits historical low." (Via Memeorandum.)


Thursday, August 17, 2017

Cullen Murphy, Are We Rome?

This is something I've obviously been thinking about, although clearly the U.S. is a vastly more powerful empire (if we're an "empire") than Rome ever was.

But still, it's what comes to mind sometimes.

At Amazon, Cullen Murphy, Are We Rome? The Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America.



Tuesday, July 11, 2017

Young Japanese People Are Not Having Sex

That's not good, heh.

At the Independent U.K., "Nearly half of Japanese people are entering their 30s without any sexual experience, leaving the country facing a steep population decline":
The country is facing a steep population decline as a growing number of youngsters abstain from sex and avoid romantic relationships.

Some men claimed they "find women scary" as a poll found that 43 per cent of people aged 18 to 34 from the island nation say they are virgins.

One woman, when asked why they think 64 per cent of people in the same age group are not in relationships, said she thought men "cannot be bothered" to ask the opposite sex on dates because it was easier to watch internet porn.

The number of births dropped below one million in Japan for the first time last year, according to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

Japan's National Institute of Population and Social Security Research predicts that the country's current population of 127 million will decline by nearly 40 million by 2065.

The fertility crisis has left politicians scratching their heads as to why youngsters are not having more sex...
Plus, more from Ed Driscoll, at Instapundit, "IT’S A TRICK QUESTION: THEY’RE NOT COMING FROM ANYWHERE. Question: Where do Japanese babies come from?":
Who knew how prescient the Vapors were in 1980, when they warned, “No sex, no drug, no wine, no women?”


Wednesday, June 7, 2017

Chrystia Freeland's a Bloody Idiot

Canada's reorienting its foreign policy, claiming that the U.S. is no longer the leader of the free world.

Oh boy, I'd love to let Ottawa have a piece of my mind. No extended deterrence for you!

At Blazing Cat Fur, "Good Manners Backed by Muscle Mark Canada’s Approach to the World, Chrystia Freeland Says."


Wednesday, April 12, 2017

Dodge Challenger Demon (VIDEO)

Unreal.

At Fox News, "The 2018 Dodge Challenger SRT Demon is an absolute beast":

The Demon makes the Hellcat look like a church mouse.

The wide-body Dodge Challenger SRT Demon is a barely street-legal drag racer with a V8 that can produce up to 840 HP and 770 pound-feet of torque, making it the most powerful American car ever. It’s also the quickest car in the world, with an NHRA certified 0-60 mph time of 2.3 seconds and a quarter-mile time of 9.65 seconds at 140 mph...
More.

Wednesday, April 5, 2017

The Truly Lethal F-22/F-15C Combination

Interesting piece, from Dave Majumdar, at the National Interest, "America's F-15 and F-22 Stealth Raptor: The Ultimate Combination?"


Tuesday, February 28, 2017

America Must Lead

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former Prime Minister of Denmark and former NATO Secretary General, is the author of The Will to Lead: America's Indispensable Role in the Global Fight for Freedom.

He's got a great segment at Prager University:



Tuesday, January 31, 2017

ICYMI: Eliot Cohen, The Big Stick

*BUMPED*

I'm going on an Amazon book splurge on the first of the month.

This one's at the top of my list.

At Amazon, Eliot Cohen, The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force.

Tuesday, January 24, 2017

Should We Bring Back 'Big Stick' Dipomacy?

Professor Eliot Cohen's out with a new book, at Amazon, The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force.

And here's his op-ed at LAT from last week, "Should the U.S. still carry a ‘big stick’?":
To the extent that President-elect Donald Trump has articulated a coherent view of foreign affairs, it appears to be that the United States needs to reject most policies of the post-1945 period. NATO is a bad bargain; nuclear proliferation is a good thing; Russian President Vladimir Putin is an admirable fellow; great deals that advantage only us should replace free trade.

In his unique way, Trump is forcing a question that probably should have been up for debate 25 years ago: Should the United States stay a global power that maintains world order — including by force of arms, what Theodore Roosevelt famously called “the big stick”?

Curiously, the death of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did not immediately occasion that debate. In the 1990s, keeping a global leadership role for the United States looked cheap — other nations, after all, paid for the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In that conflict and America’s succeeding interventions in the former Yugoslavia, costs and casualties were low. Then in the early 2000s, Americans were understandably absorbed by the consequences of 9/11 and the ensuing wars and terror attacks. Now, for better or worse, the debate is upon us.

It is worth keeping some history in mind as we decide whether to reject the posture that the United States has maintained abroad for more than half a century.

*****

President Obama hoped to end the wars he had inherited in 2008. Instead, he launched America’s third war in Iraq, ramped up our deployments in Afghanistan, expanded by an order of magnitude our campaign of counter-terrorist assassination and ordered an air campaign against the Libyan government. He deployed warships near China’s man-made islands and began redeploying American forces to a frightened Eastern Europe. Reality, not ideology, overcame his principled reluctance to exerting American power.

The choice between global engagement and America First is bogus. As in the last century, our choice is whether to lead wisely, firmly and usually peacefully while we can, or to send men and women into harm’s way belatedly and bloodily when we must. Let us hope that the new president comes to understand that we need the “big stick” not “to make America great again,” but to keep a peace that is precious, fragile and worth protecting.
RTWT.

Thursday, December 15, 2016

Merkel and Whose Army?

From Hans Kundnani, at Foreign Policy, "A German military that practices with broomsticks isn't in a position to become the new “leader of the free world”":

In Germany, Angela Merkel is known as “mommy” — and judging from the desperate global reactions to the election as U.S. president of Donald Trump, it won’t be long before the rest of the world starts calling her that, too. With Trump having indicated an intention to abdicate America’s role as “leader of the free world,” a chorus of commentators have pointed to Germany under Merkel’s leadership as the most obvious replacement.

However, as Merkel herself has been quick to acknowledge — including on Nov. 20 when she announced she would run for a fourth term as chancellor — the idea is absurd. First, German power has always been regional, not global, which means it has little to offer vulnerable Western allies in Asia; Germany could therefore at most replace the United States as the “leader of a free Europe.”

But even that notion is a fantasy. If the leadership in question were purely a question of moral symbolism, Germany might qualify for it — though even that is questionable. But it also describes a set of concrete military responsibilities, stretching back to the Cold War, to defend the security of other democracies. These are responsibilities that Germany — which has only minimal military power and deep-seated reluctance, both political and cultural, to deploy what power it has — is singularly unable to fulfill.

Carol Giacomo of the New York Times suggested shortly after the U.S. election that Germany “replace America in leading NATO.” But any country either obliged or inclined — as Germany was, during a 2014 NATO exercise — to have its soldiers paint wooden sticks black and attach them to armored vehicles in lieu of heavy machine guns is not in a position to claim military leadership.

A simple comparison of the military budgets of Germany and the United States serves to illustrate the problem. In 2015, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the U.S. defense budget was $597.5 billion. Germany’s was $36.7 billion — about one-twentieth the size of America’s. Germany’s military budget is small even in comparison to that of France ($46.8 billion) and the United Kingdom ($56.2 billion), which are also, like the United Sates and unlike Germany, nuclear powers. In that sense, despite the political challenges they currently face, the heads of the French and British governments have a greater claim to be the “leader of the free world” than the chancellor of Germany.

Germany’s level of defense spending looks even more inadequate when one considers it in relation to the size of the German economy. NATO members collectively commit to spending 2 percent of GDP on defense, but only four members apart from the United States (Greece, Estonia, Poland, and the United Kingdom) actually do so. For years, Germany had spent 1.3 percent — at the lower end of the scale of NATO members. But it has fallen further in the last couple of years and is now under 1.2 percent. This year, Merkel finally committed eventually to reach the 2 percent target — after the election of Trump, she has simply restated this position — but has not specified when she will do so. Berlin’s only hard commitment is an 8 percent uptick in defense spending in 2017, which will bring it to 1.22 percent of GDP.

A similar picture emerges when one goes beyond the figures on defense spending and considers capabilities...
Keep reading.

It's a good piece. I'm cutting Foreign Policy a little slack on this one.

Wednesday, December 7, 2016

Wednesday, August 24, 2016

The Future of American Primacy

The National Interest's got a series running, mostly by realists (those skeptical of aggressive forward use of U.S. military power, especially of the neoconservative variety).

It's worth a read, in any case.

Here:

* Leslie Gelb, "The Future of U.S. Primacy: Power to Lead, But No Longer to Command."

* Geoffrey Wheatcroft, "Is a Rational American Foreign Policy Even Possible?"

* Robert D. Kaplan, "Is Primacy Overrated?"

* Barry Posen, "The High Costs and Limited Benefits of America’s Alliances."

* Barry Gewen, "American Power in an Age of Disorder."
Personally, I'm not worried about the continued preponderance of American power in the international system. I'm worried about American leadership of the system. That's the key theme of Rober Lieber's book, Retreat and its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the Problem of World Order.

And see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position."

Thursday, August 18, 2016

A Defense Strategy for the New Administration

From Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., at Foreign Affairs, "Preserving Primacy":

The next U.S. president will inherit a security environment in which the United States con­fronts mounting threats with increasingly constrained resources, diminished stature, and growing uncertainty both at home and abroad over its willingness to protect its friends and its interests. Revisionist powers in Europe, the western Pacific, and the Persian Gulf—three regions long considered by both Democratic and Republican administrations to be vital to U.S. national security—are seeking to overturn the rules-based international order. In Europe, Russian President Vladimir Putin has seized Crimea, waged proxy warfare in eastern Ukraine, and threatened NATO allies on Russia’s periphery. Further demonstrating its newfound assertiveness, Russia has dispatched forces to Syria and strength­ened its nuclear arsenal. After a failed attempt to “reset” relations with Moscow, U.S. President Barack Obama has issued stern warnings and imposed economic sanctions, but these have done little to deter Putin.

Nor has the administration’s “pivot” to Asia, now five years on, been matched by effective action. China continues to ramp up its military spending, investing heavily in weapons systems designed to threaten U.S. forces in the western Pacific. As a result, it is proving increas­ingly willing and able to advance its expansive territorial claims in the East China and South China Seas. Not content to resolve its disputes through diplomacy, Beijing has militarized them, building bases on natural and artificially created islands. The United States has failed to respond vigorously to these provocations, causing allies to question its willingness to meet its long-standing security commitments.

The lack of U.S. leadership is also fueling instability in the Middle East. In Iraq, the Obama administration forfeited hard-won gains by withdrawing all U.S. forces, creating a security vacuum that enabled the rise of both Iranian influence and the Islamic State, or ISIS. Adding to its strategic missteps, the administration fundamentally misread the character of the Arab Spring, failing to appreciate that the uprisings would provide opportunities for radical Islamist elements rather than lead to a new democratic order. The administration also failed to learn from the previous administration’s experience in Iraq when it chose to “lead from behind” in Libya, intervening to over­throw Muammar al-Qaddafi, only to declare victory and abandon the country to internal disorder. It then drew a “redline” over President Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria but failed to act to enforce it. The result is growing instability in the Middle East and a decline in U.S. influence.

The threat of Islamist terrorism has grown on the Obama administration’s watch. Al Qaeda and ISIS, both Sunni groups, have gained new footholds in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and even West Africa. Obama’s negotiations with Iran, the home of radical Shiite Islamism, have not curbed the country’s involvement in proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen or its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. What the talks did produce—the nuclear deal—may slow Tehran’s march to ob­taining a nuclear weapon, but it also gives the regime access to tens of billions of dollars in formerly frozen assets. The ink on the agreement was barely dry when, in March, Tehran tested ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, in blatant defiance of a UN Security Council resolution. Adding to all this instability, military competition has expanded into the relatively new domains of outer space and cyberspace—and will eventually extend to undersea economic infrastructure, as well.

With the current approach failing, the next president will need to formulate a new defense strategy. It should include three basic elements: a clear statement of what the United States seeks to achieve, an understanding of the resources available for those goals, and guidance as to how those resources will be used. The strategy laid out here, if properly implemented, will allow the United States to preclude the rise of a hegemonic power along the Eurasian periphery and preserve access to the global commons—without bankrupting the country in the process...
Sounds great.

Frankly, I'm not worried about the U.S. maintaining its material preponderance, even with China supposedly "catching up."

It's that we need robust, non-politically correct leadership. Global preponderance is a state of mind as well as an objective reality. I'd argue that President Barack Hussein wanted to chop the U.S. down to size, to attack U.S. global hegemony at home, for ideological reasons. He's still doing with his appeasement and apology tours.

America will lead again, in both word and power. It's just a matter of the political dynamics. A Hillary Clinton administration's just going to be four more years of Obama's failed policies. But the pendulum is going to swing back to American exceptionalism at some point. Of that I remain optimistic.

But keep reading, in any case.

Saturday, April 23, 2016

Why China Won't Overtake the United States

Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth have a great new scholarly article out at International Security, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position."

And the authors have a shorter version for policymakers and general readers, at Foreign Affairs, "The Once and Future Superpower":
In forecasts of China’s future power position, much has been made of the country’s pressing domestic challenges: its slowing economy, polluted environment, widespread corruption, perilous financial markets, nonexistent social safety net, rapidly aging population, and restive middle class. But as harmful as these problems are, China’s true Achilles’ heel on the world stage is something else: its low level of technological expertise compared with the United States’. Relative to past rising powers, China has a much wider technological gap to close with the leading power. China may export container after container of high-tech goods, but in a world of globalized production, that doesn’t reveal much. Half of all Chinese exports consist of what economists call “processing trade,” meaning that parts are imported into China for assembly and then exported afterward. And the vast majority of these Chinese exports are directed not by Chinese firms but by corporations from more developed countries.

When looking at measures of technological prowess that better reflect the national origin of the expertise, China’s true position becomes clear. World Bank data on payments for the use of intellectual property, for example, indicate that the United States is far and away the leading source of innovative technologies, boasting $128 billion in receipts in 2013—more than four times as much as the country in second place, Japan. China, by contrast, imports technologies on a massive scale yet received less than $1 billion in receipts in 2013 for the use of its intellectual property. Another good indicator of the technological gap is the number of so-called triadic patents, those registered in the United States, Europe, and Japan. In 2012, nearly 14,000 such patents originated in the United States, compared with just under 2,000 in China. The distribution of highly influential articles in science and engineering—those in the top one percent of citations, as measured by the National Science Foundation—tells the same story, with the United States accounting for almost half of these articles, more than eight times China’s share. So does the breakdown of Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology or Medicine. Since 1990, 114 have gone to U.S.-based researchers. China-based researchers have received two.

Precisely because the Chinese economy is so unlike the U.S. economy, the measure fueling expectations of a power shift, GDP, greatly underestimates the true economic gap between the two countries. For one thing, the immense destruction that China is now wreaking on its environment counts favorably toward its GDP, even though it will reduce economic capacity over time by shortening life spans and raising cleanup and health-care costs. For another thing, GDP was originally designed to measure mid-twentieth-century manufacturing economies, and so the more knowledge-based and global­ized a country’s production is, the more its GDP underestimates its economy’s true size.

A new statistic developed by the UN suggests the degree to which GDP inflates China’s relative power. Called “inclusive wealth,” this measure represents economists’ most systematic effort to date to calculate a state’s wealth. As a UN report explained, it counts a country’s stock of assets in three areas: “(i) manufactured capital (roads, buildings, machines, and equipment), (ii) human capital (skills, education, health), and (iii) natural capital (sub-soil resources, ecosystems, the atmosphere).” Added up, the United States’ inclusive wealth comes to almost $144 trillion—4.5 times China’s $32 trillion.

The true size of China’s economy relative to the United States’ may lie somewhere in between the numbers provided by GDP and inclusive wealth, and admittedly, the latter measure has yet to receive the same level of scrutiny as GDP. The problem with GDP, however, is that it measures a flow (typically, the value of goods and services produced in a year), whereas inclusive wealth measures a stock. As The Economist put it, “Gauging an economy by its GDP is like judging a company by its quarterly profits, without ever peeking at its balance-sheet.” Because inclusive wealth measures the pool of resources a government can conceivably draw on to achieve its strategic objectives, it is the more useful metric when thinking about geopolitical competition.

But no matter how one compares the size of the U.S. and Chinese economies, it is clear that the United States is far more capable of converting its resources into military might. In the past, rising states had levels of technological prowess similar to those of leading ones. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, the United States didn’t lag far behind the United Kingdom in terms of technology, nor did Germany lag far behind the erstwhile Allies during the interwar years, nor was the Soviet Union backward technologically compared with the United States during the early Cold War. This meant that when these challengers rose economically, they could soon mount a serious military challenge to the dominant power. China’s relative technological backwardness today, however, means that even if its economy continues to gain ground, it will not be easy for it to catch up militarily and become a true global strategic peer, as opposed to a merely a major player in its own neighborhood...
More.

Wednesday, March 9, 2016

The World Is Getting Worse, But This Time America Won't Save It

From Dennis Prager, via Blazing Cat Fur:
I cannot imagine any thinking person who does not believe the world is getting worse.

The number of slaughtered and the number of refugees from slaughter is immense and growing.

Islamic State now controls territories from Afghanistan to West Africa. Libya is in the process of being added to that list. And other sadistic Islamist movements hold additional territory.

According to Pew Research, approximately 10 percent of world Muslims have a favorable opinion of the Islamic State and terror against civilians.

That’s more than 100 million people...
Keep reading.